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Back From the Dead: 
How to Revive Transfer Pricing Enforcement 
 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah1 
 
Transfer pricing enforcement is dead 
Edward Kleinbard (2007) 
 
In the six years since the then Chief of Staff of the JCT pronounced transfer 
pricing enforcement to be dead, numerous case studies have demonstrated 
the truth of his observation, starting with the JCTs own examination of six US 
based multinationals (MNEs) in 2010 and followed by the Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations hearings on Microsoft, HP and Apple in 2012-
13. There is little doubt that the current transfer pricing rules, in conjunction 
with the dysfunctional Subpart F rules, allow US-based MNEs to shift most of 
their profits to low tax jurisdictions. It is estimated that there are currently 
about 2 trillion dollars of such profits that benefit from deferral and cannot be 
repatriated because they are not subject to foreign tax and therefore would be 
subject to full US taxation upon repatriation under current law. Hence the push 
to adopt territoriality and allow the MNEs to distribute these trapped profits as 
dividends to their US parent, which can then in turn use them to pay dividends 
to its shareholders.  
 
The OECD has recently come to recognize that the transfer pricing system 
does not work as intended. In its report on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 
the OECD recognizes that BEPS results in revenue losses that affect all 
states, especially poorer ones; that systematic tax avoidance by the richest 
and most powerful companies in the world undermines the general legitimacy 
of taxation; that it gives MNEs significant competitive advantages over purely 
domestic firms, resulting in inefficient allocations of investment and major 
distortions to economic activity; and that it skews the decisions of the MNEs 
themselves, resulting in overall economic welfare losses. 
 
This article will contrast three approaches to dealing with the BEPS problem: 
adopting a unitary taxation regime; ending deferral; and adopting anti base 
erosion measures. It concludes that while the first approach is the best long 
term option, the other two are more promising as immediate candidates for 
adoption in the context of US tax reform and the OECD BEPS project. 

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1. Unitary Taxation 
 
Unitary taxation (UT) involves treating each MNES as a single unit, 
disregarding the formal distinctions among its constituent corporations, and 
allocating its profits to the various taxing jurisdictions by formula. This is the 
approach adopted by the US states and the Canadian provinces, and that is 
being considered for adoption by the EU as a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base, or CCCTB. 
 
In principle, UT has two major advantages over the current system. First, it is 
a better fit for the way a modern MNE operates, since most MNEs are 
integrated units with no attention being paid to the formal distinctions among 
parent and subsidiaries except for tax and limiting liability purposes. Second, 
UT applies the same regime to all MNEs and does not rely on the increasingly 
unimportant question of where the parent corporation is resident.  
 
But UT faces formidable obstacles to being adopted. First, it confronts 
considerable opposition from the OECD, which remains formally committed to 
the separate accounting method and the arms length standard (ALS). The 
OECD interprets its model treaty as forbidding the application of UT to parent 
subsidiary combinations, and has recently reinterpreted the model to apply 
similar rules to branches as well, including situations where a subsidiary can 
be deemed to be a dependent agent Permanent establishment (PE) of its 
parent. Second, in the absence of agreement on the allocation formula UT 
runs the risk of creating more double taxation. Third, a formula that relies on 
factors such as the location of assets or payroll risks driving MNEs to shift 
jobs to low tax jurisdictions. 
 
I believe that in principle these objections can be overcome. I have argued 
elsewhere that the OECD interpretation of the treaties is not persuasive and 
that many treaties contain language that permits the application of formulas to 
subsidiaries that are considered dependent agent PEs of their parent, as long 
as the result is consistent with the arms length standard, which in the absence 
of comparables will be impossible to disprove. The double taxation risk is to 
some extent under the control of the MNEs, and is not more problematic than 
the reality of double non-taxation and the risk of double taxation under the 
current regime. The disagreement over the formula and the threat to jobs can 
be alleviated if the formula relies only on the destination of sales, since the 
costumer base is less subject to tax competition and states generally like to 
tax imports and exempt exports. 
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Nevertheless, I think that in the immediate context of US tax reform and the 
BEPS project, UT is a bridge too far: there are too many technical details that 
need to be worked out for it to become a viable solution in the next couple of 
years. The best that can be hoped for is for the OECD to realize that the 
allocation of the residual profit under the profit split method, which is its 
preferred method for dealing with income from intangibles and other forms of 
income that are hard to source under the ALS, should be done under a 
formula and not left to each country to deal with as it pleases (the US 
allocates it to where R and D takes place, which favors its revenue interests 
but is irrelevant to the location of profits). Such a formulary approach to 
dealing with the residual would address the bulk of the problem while not 
violating the ALS, since the OECD agrees that in the absence of comparables 
any allocation of the residual is compatible with the ALS.  
 
In the longer term, I do hope that even the OECD will be persuaded to move 
toward UT. If the EU adopts the CCCTB, this will give us a good working 
example in the context of high tax jurisdictions. Thus, I will continue to work on 
UT solutions, because these are the best outcome for a world in which 
integrated MNEs do not really belong to any jurisdiction. But this is a long term 
project. 
 
2. Abolishing deferral. 
 
It has also been realized for a long time that abolishing deferral deals 
effectively with the outbound transfer pricing problem for US based MNEs. In 
fact, Subpart F was enacted with the understanding that it will deal with the 
transfer pricing problem by subjecting all income that was likely to escape 
high foreign taxes to immediate US tax. The problem is that the world has 
changed in two ways since then: First, it is now possible to earn active income 
in many jurisdictions without foreign tax because of tax competition, and 
second, Subpart F has been undermined by the check the box regulations 
and the subsequent adoption of 954(c)(6). 
 
The usual arguments against abolishing deferral are that it will put US 
multinationals at a competitive disadvantage, that it will lead to inefficient 
outcomes because less efficient foreign MNEs will obtain projects that should 
have been owned by more efficient US MNEs, and that it will lead to migration 
of US MNEs to other countries and to the establishment of new MNEs in other 
jurisdictions with more favorable tax rules. 
 
3
Avi-Yonah:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
All of these arguments assume that abolishing deferral can only be done 
unilaterally. But the OECD BEPS project action plan envisages strengthening 
CFC rules, and I believe this presents the US with a golden opportunity to 
abolish or significantly restrict deferral while pushing other OECD members 
and large developing countries to follow the same route. As discussed below, 
option Y of Sen. Baucus’ recent proposal is the best vehicle for achieving this 
goal. 
 
If all the large jurisdictions in the OECD and G20 agree to severely curtail their 
deferral or exemption systems, this addresses all the arguments raised 
against doing so unilaterally. There will be no competitive disadvantage or 
inefficiency since the competition will be subject to the same rules, and it will 
not be possible to move to another jurisdiction since the likely headquarters 
jurisdictions will also follow the same rules.2  
 
3. Base Erosion. 
 
Abolishing deferral does nothing to address inbound transfer pricing abuse. 
Thus, I believe that it should be coupled with significant anti base erosion 
limitations. As suggested by Lowell and Wells, these should include an overall 
limit on deductible payments to related foreign parties, including cost of goods 
sold, interest and royalties. Such limits can be taken in conjunction with 
abolishing deferral and together these two steps will go a long way toward 
eliminating transfer pricing abuse. 
 
4. The Baucus Proposal. 
 
On the face of it, Sen. Baucus’ proposal would seem to go in the opposite 
direction of what I suggest should be done, because it adopts territoriality as 
its base line. The main concern with territoriality is that it will encourage MNEs 
to shift even more profits overseas because they will no longer face 
constraints against bringing them back onshore. The proposal to tax the 
accumulated 2 trillion that are currently offshore at a lower rate of 20% would 
likewise seem to reward profit shifting. 
 

2Strengthening the exit tax provisions of IRC 7874 by imposing a deemed sale 
of all assets upon expatriation via merger and adopting a managed and 
controlled test for corporate residence would help prevent tax induced moves 
of corporate headquarters. 

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But Sen. Baucus’ proposal also includes anti-shifting rules that go a long way 
toward mitigating these concerns. These come in two varieties dubbed 
options Y and Z. Under both options, income of CFCs from sales of goods 
and services into the US will be subject to immediate US tax. Income from 
foreign sales would under option Y be taxed at 80% of the US rate with a 
credit for foreign taxes. Under option Z, such income would be subject to full 
US tax unless it is connected with an active foreign business operation, in 
which case it will be subject to tax at 60% of the US rate with credit for foreign 
taxes. 
 
I believe that the US sale rule is an important innovation because it means 
that we tax the CFC based on the ultimate destination of the sale of its goods 
or services regardless of whether it has a PE in the US and regardless of 
whether the sale is done through an unrelated conduit. This can be an 
important precedent for the kind of Unitary Taxation discussed above in which 
at least the residual profits of all corporations (not just CFCs) are taxed in the 
country they are sold into.  
 
Of the two options, I strongly prefer option Y because it does not distinguish 
between types of foreign income and because the differential between the US 
rate and the rate applicable to foreign income is much smaller. Option Z relies 
on an antiquated distinction between active and passive income of MNEs that 
is very difficult to police in practice, as borne out by the experience of other 
countries that have similar rules. Moreover, this distinction has nothing to do 
with competitiveness, which is determined by the overall tax burden of the 
MNE. 
 
If option Y is adopted, it will go a long way toward abolishing deferral. Assume 
that the US tax rate is 30%. Under option Y this will put the US tax rate on 
foreign income at 24%, which is about the OECD average. While there will still 
be a difference between US and foreign operations, the shifting potential 
would be significantly reduced. 
 
If option Y is adopted by the US, the likelihood that the OECD would be willing 
to follow suit is quite high. The empirical data show that EU MNEs already 
bear an effective tax rate on their overall profits that is higher than 24% and 
higher than that borne by US based MNEs. Thus, other OECD countries that 
are currently under pressure to reduce the effective tax rates of their MNEs 
because of competition from the US but that also need the added revenue 
more than the US will be able to use the Baucus proposal as a reason to cut 
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back on their exemption systems and apply their tax rates, which are also 
about 24% on average, to the entire operation of their MNEs. 
 
The history of international taxation is replete with examples in which 
unilateral moves by the US led other countries to adopt similar rules. The 
foreign tax credit, CFC rules, the transfer pricing methods, the branch profit 
tax and most recently FATCA were all American innovations copied by other 
countries. Unfortunately, the same is true for the portfolio interest exemption 
and the check the box rules, which led to a race to the bottom. It is time for the 
US to resume its natural position as leader in a race to the top. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The best way to kill transfer pricing abuse now is to adopt option Y of the 
Baucus proposal in conjunction with anti base erosion rules aimed at 
protecting the US tax base from foreign MNEs. If US based MNEs are to be 
taxed in full on their sales into the US, there is no reason not to apply the 
same rules to foreign based MNEs selling into the US. This can be done by 
adopting the anti base erosion rule and by using sales destination as the basis 
for allocating the residual under the profit split method. 
 
In the longer run, I believe we should erase the distinction between US and 
foreign based MNEs by subjecting both to UT with formulary apportionment, 
which should in principle lead to a purely territorial system with no Subpart F 
or foreign tax credit needed. But we are not there yet, and in the immediate 
future curtailing deferral and base erosion are the best ways or the US to push 
the BEPS project forward. 
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